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Background and Context 
The participation of the private sector in the 
implementation of the Malawi Agricultural 
Input Subsidy Programme (MAISP) has varied 
considerably since the commencement of the 
subsidy in 2005/06. The private sector has 
always been involved in the importation of 
fertilizers and in the retail of subsidized seeds. 
However, there has been variable participation 
of the private sector in the retail of subsidized 
fertilizers, with the private sector involved in 
retailing of subsidized fertilizers through 
coupon redemption only in the 2006/07 and 
2007/08 agricultural seasons. The exclusion of 
the private sector has implications for the 
development of the private marketing system 
and efficiency of delivering inputs to 
smallholder farmers. This policy brief 
highlights the impact of private sector 
exclusion on the performance of the sector, 
drawing on information from a survey of retail 
input suppliers in six districts, key informant 
interviews in these districts and with national 
seed and fertiliser suppliers, household and 
community survey information, and secondary 
sources. 
 
Structure of Input Supply Sector 
The input supply sector can be divided into the 
two sub-sectors: fertilizer and seed supply. The 
fertilizer supply sector comprises major and 
well-established private firms, small/new 
entry firms and state-owned enterprises 
involved in the procurement of fertilizers. At 
retail and distribution level, there are 
distributors, farmer cooperatives, independent 
agro-dealers, supermarkets or independent 
retail shops and retail markets for state-owned 
enterprises.  
The uncertainty of the fertilizer market and the 
exclusion of the private sector in the retailing of 
fertilizers in 2008/09 led to significant changes in 
the structure of the fertilizer market. For instance, 
the National Smallholder Farmers Association of 
Malawi (NASFAM) and Rab Processors withdrew 
from fertilizer supply while Yara closed down its 
international presence in Malawi. There has also 
been an increase in the number of companies 
bidding on Government of Malawi contracts to 
supply fertilizers to the subsidy programme. The 
increasing volatility of the market and policy 
inconsistency and unpredictability has weakened 
the cohesion of the Malawi Fertilizer Association 
(MFA). 
The seed industry that has continued to 
participate fully in the subsidy programme has 
witnessed substantial progress. In terms of its 
structure it is more organised under the Seed Trade 
Association of Malawi (STAM). At procurement 
level, the sector comprises international companies 
specialising in hybrids/OPV maize seeds and local 
companies and smallholder seed multiplication 
groups specialising in OPV seeds. The retail sector 
consists of fertilizer distributor shops, farmer 
cooperative shops, agro-dealers, and Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC) and Smallholder Farmer Fertilizer 
Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFM) retail shops 
across the country. 
The retail sectors in both fertilizer and seed 
industries do not exclusively specialise in fertilizers 
or/and seeds. Most of the retail shops sell a mixture 
of farm inputs and other consumer and capital 
goods. For instance, only 66% of the independent 
agro-dealers declared that selling maize seeds was 
their primary source of income, but they also sell 
fertilizers, herbicides, agricultural equipment, 
groceries, houseware, clothing and hardware. The 
diversity of the range of products stocked 
Policy Brief 
Number 2, May 2010 
 2
minimizes the risk of business failure 
associated with seasonality of demand for farm 
inputs. 
The study revealed a steady reduction in the 
participation of the private sector in both 
maize seeds and fertilizer marketing (Table 1) 
with an 8% fall in fertiliser retailers and a 7% 
fall in maize seed retailers from 2006/7 to 
2008/9. About 57% of retailers not selling 
fertilizers in 2008/09 attributed their decision 
to abandon fertilizer retailing to the input 
subsidy programme.  
 
Table 1 Number of Sample Retailers Selling 
Maize Seeds and Fertilizers 
 
Year 
Maize 
seed sales 
but not 
fertilizers 
Fertilizer 
sales but 
no maize 
seed 
sales 
Both 
fertilizer 
and 
maize 
seed 
sales 
Neither 
fertilizer 
nor 
maize 
seed 
sales 
2006/07 
29 9 183 9 
2007/08 
33 11 173 13 
2008/09 
36 14 162 18 
2008/09 
as % of 
2006/07 
124% 156% 89% 200% 
 
The exclusion of the private sector in the 
retailing of fertilizers has mixed impact on 
expected sales revenue with 53% distributors 
projecting lower sales while about 50% 
cooperatives and agro-dealers expecting higher 
sales in 2008/09 compared to 2007/08. The 
reasons for better sales included increased 
demand of inputs from farmers, good rains, the 
subsidy programme and lower prices.  
There was higher incidence of tips in order 
to redeem coupons at different retail markets, 
exacerbated by long queues. Long queues were 
a major issue for 78% of communities at 
SFFRFM outlets, 72% at ADMARC markets and 
60% at outlets of private companies. This 
reveals that the services at market outlets are 
generally poor and increase the transaction 
costs of procuring outputs in terms of time 
spent and the tips that farmers have to pay to 
redeem coupons. 
 
Performance of the Seed Market 
The subsidy programme continues to be 
instrumental in the development of the private 
sector seed market. The study reveals that the 
participation of the private sector in the 
subsidy programme has stimulated 
competition in the industry. Although this 
competition has increased the commissions 
received by retailers from producers and farmer 
access to seed, these price benefits have not 
accrued to smallholder farmers. Seed producers 
have used higher commissions to retailers to 
promote the sales of their seeds in addition to 
advertising and conducting demonstrations. 
The seed pricing for the subsidy programme is 
not competitive, as seed suppliers through their 
association colluded over the price that they 
negotiated with the Government. This resulted in an 
initially high price with a maximum farmer top-up 
offer to the Government. However, given the 
confusion that a top-up created in 2007/08 season, 
Government negotiated a flat rate of MK680 
without top-up. 
Seed retailers reported an increase in the seed 
sales following the subsidy programme. The agro-
dealer network and the network of ADMARC and 
SFFRFM markets play an important role in 
broadening the seed markets. Most of the retail 
markets were selling hybrid seeds, due to lower 
transport costs of hybrid compared to OPV seeds 
that generated the same revenue, but also due to 
the aggressive marketing of hybrid seed producers. 
However, flexi-vouchers were not as popular as 
anticipated - many farmers thought they were 
fraudulent vouchers because they did not have 
“maize” written on them, and therefore they did not 
use them. 
Retailers participating in the seed subsidy sales 
frequently encountered problems of stock outage, 
not having the specific seeds wanted by farmers, 
and long queues. Longer queues were evident at 
ADMARC markets partly due to the fact they were 
redeeming both seeds and fertilizers. Another 
problem experienced by retailers was attempted 
fraud, with 25% of retailers reporting incidents of 
submission of fraudulent coupons. 
A problem with the subsidy programme is the 
delay in the payment system with implications on 
the cash flow of seed suppliers. Nonetheless, the 
subsidy programme has led to business expansion 
for the agro-dealer retail network, increased 
demand for improved seeds, increased investments 
in seed marketing and increased competition in the 
sector. 
 
Performance of the Fertilizer Market 
The 2008/09 season was a difficult year for 
fertilizer distribution companies due to the 
exclusion of the private sector in the retailing of 
subsidized fertilizers. It is argued that the 
Government excluded the private sector in retailing 
of subsidized fertilizers in order to control the 
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supply under the subsidy in the absence of a 
buy-back arrangement and due to the belief 
that the private sector was more prone to 
accepting fake coupons. On the latter issue, 
however, the available evidence indicates that 
in 2007/08 about 27% and 3% of sales of 
ADMARC/SFFRFM and private sector were 
without valid coupons, respectively.  
The private sector continued to supply 
fertilizers to the subsidy programme through 
competitive tender. The study finds that 
improvements were made in the timing of 
announcement of tenders and transparency of 
the tender process, although the actual 
awarding of tenders was delayed. Although, the 
tenders are awarded on competitive basis, 
some of the firms awarded were unable to 
supply the specified amounts, resulting in re-
assigning of the defaulted quantities to other 
supplies at the original bidding prices. 
The impact of private sector exclusion in 
retailing subsidized fertilizers varied by the 
type of input suppliers. About 38% of private 
retailers (mainly agro-dealers) did not 
experience major changes in their business 
while 62% (mainly distributors) of private 
retailers experienced a significant drop in 
revenues. 
 
Conclusions and Lessons 
The implementation of the MAISP in 2008/09 
has had mixed fortunes on the development of 
the private sector input marketing system. 
While the private sector continues to 
participate in procuring fertilizers for the 
programme and retailing of seeds, their 
exclusion from the retailing of subsidized 
fertilizers has had a negative impact on market 
development in the rural areas. The exclusion 
has led to a reduction in private retail outlets, 
long queues and increased incidence of tips 
paid by smallholder farmers. The experiences 
of the 2007/08 and 2008/09 implementation 
of the subsidy programme have the following 
lessons: 
 
• It is important that the implementation of 
the agricultural input subsidy programme 
should support improved farmer access and 
choice in input purchases, and an important 
means of promoting this is through the 
development of the private sector input 
markets, particularly in rural areas. The 
programme can support this by designing 
an appropriate reward-penalty system for 
private sector involvement. 
 
• Assessing the capacity of bidding firms for the 
supply of subsidized fertilizers is critical in 
ensuring timely delivery of supplies. It is also 
important to enforce penalties in cases where 
awarded firms fail to deliver or delay in 
delivering the supplies. 
 
• More timely award of tenders should improve 
timely delivery of fertilisers and reduce 
suppliers risks and hence costs of supply. 
 
• The introduction of some form of competitive 
bidding and/or top up payments for the supply 
of seeds in the subsidy programme should be 
developed to eliminate uncompetitive behaviour 
in setting prices and allow price competition to 
benefit the farmers while at the same time 
supporting choice to farmers for different 
varieties. 
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